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RESPONSE OF KURT D. STEELE TO DENNIS S.
KARJALA'S COPYRIGHT AND
MISAPPROPRIATION*
Kurt D. Steele**
Professor Karjala in his very extensive paper Copyright and Misappropriation' has tackled a big job: exploring the need to protect
works from "piracy" or "misappropriation" which will be "underproduced" without some form of protection. The central thesis of Professor Karjala's paper is that the concept of misappropriation should
play a significant role in answering the difficult question of what copyright protection should be afforded to a variety of non-traditional
works.
Although I believe Professor Karjala at some points in his paper
becomes mired down in complex theoretical justifications, particularly
with respect to establishing originality, what is particularly refreshing
about his paper is his strong focus on the socially desirable need to
protect certain types of works. Unfortunately, too many discussions
about copyright never get beyond an arcane tour of where the copyright law has been. They forget that without appropriate incentives
many works that our society and economy increasingly need to grow
and prosper will not be produced.
While Professor Karjala discusses the copyright basis for many
different types of non-traditional works, he spends much of his time on
factual compilations and maps. These works are of great interest to our
company and to me.
With respect to compilations, I believe he overstates the point
when he says that, to a large degree, the decision in Feist Publications,
Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.2 may have been inevitable given
the copyright statutory language concerning what a compilation is and
the poorly formulated skill-based "sweat of the brow" theory of protection. Professor Karjala raises, however, the very interesting question of
whether "the Supreme Court might legitimately have adopted a less
literally correct course that nevertheless better meshed with underlying
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(1992).
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social policy." 3 But perhaps more simply, could not the Supreme Court
have taken a more expansive view of copyright for compilations that
would protect "unfair" takings of them consistent with the copyright
law?
Professor Karjala works very hard in his paper to answer this
question in the affirmative. Unfortunately, he finally draws the conclusion that given the Feist decision an amendment of the copyright law
will be necessary to adequately protect many non-traditional works
against misappropriation. I believe, however, some of Professor
Karjala's ideas effectively support the opposite conclusion and that
there should be sufficient room for courts to provide adequate protection without such an amendment. Of course, this is only a preliminary
view. While the several post-Feist decisions to date have been generally
encouraging, it remains to be seen whether the courts will fully rise to
this challenge.
As we all know, Feist holds that the only protectible expression in
a factual compilation is its original selection, coordination and arrangement of facts (the "SCA") and not the facts themselves." The threshold issue, therefore, is whether a particular compilation evidences sufficient originality to be copyrightable.
With respect to this issue, at least as it relates to compilations, I
think little more needs to be said than what the Feist Court itself said:
Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was
independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other
works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.
To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight
amount will suffice. . . . Originality does not signify novelty; a work
may be original even though it closely resembles other works so long as
the similarity is fortuitous, not the result of copying.'
I believe Professor Karjala's concern, that courts will find the minimal level of creativity that Feist requires for copyrightability and then
will "afford copyright protection to all creative aspects of protected
works," 6 is misplaced. Although I am not sure exactly what Professor
Karjala means by "creative," it is clear that both the Feist decision and
the several post-Feist decisions to date, while going to great lengths to
reaffirm the need for minimal creativity in order for a compilation to be
copyrightable, have explicitly and repeatedly affirmed that only the
SCA and not the underlying facts of the compilation are protectible.

3. Karjala, supra note 1, at 894.
4. 111 S. Ct. 1282 (interim ed. 1991).
5. Id.at 1287 (citations omitted).
6. Karjala, supra note 1, at 890.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/17
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Professor Karjala deals creatively, however, with the other major
issue-the scope of copyright for copyrightable works. Although he
takes his time in acknowledging that if copyrightability means anything
for a compilation it means you cannot make a direct, mechanical copy
of it, he also raises the very important question of whether the scope of
protection should also cover substantial takings, or even limited takings, of part of an original compilation for use in a variety of contexts
without protecting ideas per se. Such contexts include use in a competitive work, in a non-competitive work, in connection with a verbatim
taking of only the facts but not the coordination and arrangement and
in connection with a taking as the basis of a new value-added work.
Professor Karjala reminds us that the difficult problems of deciding where facts end and expression begins is present in both compilations and textual works. As he indicates, in addition to the verbatim
language, idea-like elements of structure and plot are protectible in a
novel. On the other hand, although expressions of historical and scientific ideas are protectible, courts have usually accorded less protection
to those expressions because of their idea content.
Professor Karjala suggests that some courts have shown significant
flexibility in drawing the line between idea and expression by implicitly
evaluating the "fairness" of the taking. He argues that long-established
misappropriation notions inherent in the fair use defense and common
law misappropriation should be useful in helping to define the scope of
protection for compilations.
Although I recognize I am taking a little editorial license, I believe
Professor Karjala is saying several very important things here:
(1) The Feist mandate of limiting the scope of protection to only
the SCA of a compilation could be unfair in many cases because arguably it permits a subsequent "author" to take many of the "facts" of
a compilation as long as the selection of such facts and their arrangement and coordination are not substantially the same.
(2) The natural result of such a scope-of-protection standard will
be that many compilations that are produced today will be "underproduced" because the economic investment required will not be rewarded and that would be "unfair." Our society and economy will suffer as a result.
(3) Although, as Feist makes emphatically clear, only original expression is protectible and "raw facts" may be reused by subsequent
authors, what the raw facts are is not easily discernible in many cases.
Just as for textual works, fair use or misappropriation concepts would
be very helpful in determining the scope of protection. The use of these
concepts in defining the scope of protection should result in a better
balancebybetween
underprotection
and overprotection determined in acPublished
eCommons,
1991
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cordance with the specifics of each situation, and in particular, should
address in a fundamentally fairer way how to draw the line between
idea and expression:
Using Professor Karjala's approach, I suggest the following possible compilation fair use criteria that could be used to draw a more
informed line between expression and idea:
(1) The substantialityof the taking from the copyrighted compilation. To a large degree, this criterion would cover the Feist elements of
selection, coordination and arrangement, but the inquiry would go on to
consider the following criteria.
(2) The nature of the 'facts" and in particular the degree to
which the 'facts" in the compilation are "value-added" versus "raw."
The case law really has not dealt in very much detail with the concept
that not all "facts" are' the same. Some facts are much more common
and widely known, or in the parlance of Feist, "raw." Their compilation should obviously be protected less than other "facts" where there
is significant "value-added" authorship involved. Of course, in the latter case we probably are talking about "expression" and not "facts" at
7
all.
(3) The degree to which the second work adds value to the facts
taken or transforms them into something else. While we all know that
preparing derivative works is one of the exclusive rights given to a
copyright holder, there is still a legitimate issue of what use the appropriated facts have been put to in the second work. If they have only
been the starting points for the creation of substantially new "valueadded" facts, and depending upon the number taken and an evaluation
of the other criteria suggested here, such use might be considered
"fair."
(4) The degree to which the second work is competitive with the
first work or can be a substitute for it. To use the classical "fair use"
example, if the second work is scholarly and the first work is published
for business uses, in many cases the use of facts from the first work
would be considered "fair," depending, of course, on an evaluation of
the other criteria suggested here. This would be the case, as Professor
Karjala suggests, if the first work contains "hot" facts which lose their
7. For example, one of Rand McNally's businesses involves the creation of road mileages,
which are used as a basis for determining trucking tariffs. While these miles may appear to be just
raw "facts," they are in reality the result of a value-added cartographic and algorithmatic process
based on a series of complex rules. In many cases, our tariff miles would not be the same as the
miles you might measure if you physically measured them yourself. This sounds as if we are not
talking about just "facts," but rather protectible expression. Someone else should not be able to
copy protectible expression substantially just because they take some lesser, but still substantial,
number of the mileages and arrange them differently. This would be particularly so if our milehttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/17
ages were taken and used in a competitive way.

1992]

RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR KARJALA

commercial value over time and the second work is published after
such facts "cool." On the other hand, there should be a much more
difficult burden placed on the author of a second work, which is viewed
by the marketplace as very competitive with the first work, even if the
taking from the first work was of a limited number of facts and the
coordination/arrangement was generally different, unless, of course, after an analysis the facts are only "raw."
By looking to all of these factors together, a court should be able
to make a much more informed decision about where to draw the line
between expression and idea. Although there is no question that several
courts that have handed down decisions after Feist have struggled to
draw the scope-of-protection line by implicitly trying to use these factors, the strong language in Feist has not let them do this in a very
explicit fashion, particularly with reference to the last three fair use
factors suggested above. In large part, I believe this is the result of the
unambiguous nature of the "facts" in the Feist case, namely telephone
listings. If the facts had been "clothed" with more expression, the Feist
Court would have been forced to give us more guidance on how to separate unprotectible raw facts from protectible factual expression.
Nonetheless, recent cases like Key Publications v. Chinatown Today Publishing Enterprises,8 which was handed down by the Second
Circuit a short time ago, shows sensitivity to some of these misappropriation factors. While the court repeats the oft-quoted principle that
"[clompilers operating under different principles of selection are not
obligated to repeat factual research already undertaken . . . by
others," it is implicitly concerned with whether the two works in question are in competition when it notes: "Indeed, any consumer faced
with the two directories would instantly realize that they are quite different." 9 The court also seems implicitly concerned with the value of
taking a limited but commercially significant part of a plaintiff's work
when it says: "If the Galore Directory had exactly duplicated a substantial designated portion of the 1989-90 Key Directory-for example,
all its listings of professionals such as medical doctors, lawyers, accountants, engineers and architects, an infringement action would
succeed.""
What about maps? Since Rand McNally is the world's largest
commercial mapmaker, I am, of course, gratified by the very extensive
treatment Professor Karjala gives to the copyright of maps. As Professor Karjala points out, the copyright issues as they relate to maps are

8. 945 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1991).
9. Id. at 516.
10.byId.
at 517.
Published
eCommons,
1991
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more complicated in some ways than they are with respect to non-map
compilations.
I believe we can agree that a map is something more than just a
compilation of facts. Each map is an attempt to portray three-dimensional reality on a two-dimensional sheet and represent that on a much
smaller scale. A map has some elements of a compilation, however,
since the creation of a map from facts in the public domain necessarily
involves a selection, coordination and arrangement of facts and their
translation into a pictorial/graphic form.
As a starting matter, I believe Professor Karjala takes too restrictive a view of the issue of whether most maps will evidence sufficient
originality under the Feist standard to be copyrightable. I am not sure
what he means when he says: "[W]here the landmarks shown are the
obvious ones or the result of some standard classification scheme, as
will often be the case, there will be no creativity of selection under
Feist."" For almost all maps, there is judgment involved in selecting
the degree of detail that will be displayed on the map and the geographic scope of the map.
I also do not know what Professor Karjala means by: "Nor is there
creativity in the resulting picture, at least if it follows typical mapmaking standards, because all shapes and locations are constrained by the
actual geography of the region presented."1 2 A map's presentation of
three-dimensional reality on a two-dimensional surface, and on a much
smaller scale, necessarily involves a change or even a distortion of reality which is determined by a mapmaker's judgment.
Instead, Professor Karjala labors to find sufficient originality to
make maps copyrightable by suggesting that we should look at the
originality in the process of fixation as contrasted to the finished work.
He says: "In the case of maps, these would be skills in displaying spatial and quantitative relationships through scale, color, symbols, and
overall design, including skills in compiling new maps from existing
13
maps."
Although Professor Karjala presents some very interesting ideas,
given the minimal original authorship required under Feist, I believe
the judgment that goes into the selection, coordination and arrangement of cartographic data should make almost all maps copyrightable
without having to resort to novel theories of originality." In addition,

II. Karjala, supra note 1, at 895.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 900.
14. However, at least one court never really considered originality under Feist. Mason v.
Montgomery Data, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 353 (S.D. Tex. 1991). In the recent Mason case, the court
denied protection for legal survey maps under the merger doctrine because it believed that there
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/17
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the copyright law gives maps broader protection than that given to nonmap compilations by including them within section 101's definition of
"pictorial, graphic and sculptural works." 15 The clearest statement
of
protection for the pictorial/graphic expression in maps was in the case
of United States v. Hamilton"6 where future Supreme Court Justice
Kennedy held that the "synthesis" of features of a terrain from prior
maps was an "element of originality" entitling the map at issue to
copyright protection." The court said: "Expression in cartography is
not so different from other artistic forms seeking to touch upon external
realities that unique rules are needed to judge whether the authorship
is original."1 " Noting that a photographer's "selection of subject, posture, background, lighting, and perhaps even perspective alone" are
granted protection, the court found that a "similar attention" should be
given to the cartographer's art: "[T]he elements of authorship embodied in a map consist not only of the depiction of a previously undiscovered landmark or the correction or improvement of scale or placement,
but also in selection, design, and synthesis." 1 9
Assuming copyrightability, however, the same difficult issue is
presented: What scope of protection should be given to maps? Although Professor Karjala takes a different approach in finding originality to support copyrightability, he suggests that at the very least a direct, mechanical copy should not be permitted of a copyrightable map.
As he did for non-map compilations, he poses the very important
question of what else should be protected. Although Professor Karjala
has a very extensive and quite provocative discussion of this issue, for
our purposes now let me just say that I agree very much with him that
this issue should be approached with the same concern for misappropriation principles that he argues for with respect to non-map compilations. In fact, I believe the fair use criteria suggested earlier for nonmap compilations should be largely transferable to the map context in
determining what is protectible expression.
Whether courts will be able, after Feist, to adequately utilize misappropriation concepts in determining the scope of protection of both

was only one way to express the data. Id. at 356. We can hope that the Fifth Circuit on appeal
realizes that this is not the case and that it applies Feist copyrightability principles to find that the
maps in question are at least copyrightable even though there may be a very limited scope of
protection.
15. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988); see Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899
F.2d 1458, 1463 (5th Cir. 1990) ("Maps are included in the category of 'pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works.' ").
16. 583 F.2d 448 (9th Cir. 1978).
17. Id. at 452.
18. Id. at 451.
19.byId.
Published
eCommons,
1991
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map and non-map compilations remains to be seen. It is simply too
early, however, to heed the call for a statutory amendment because
these types of works will be underprotected without such an amendment. We should let the courts wrestle with this issue before deciding
that Feist improperly limits them. Similarly, there is no justifiable basis
for arguing now that Feist may permit courts to overprotect these types
of works in certain circumstances. Properly understood, misappropriation concepts can be a powerful tool to use in deciding what is the
appropriate scope of protection for both map and non-map compilations
without a statutory amendment.
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